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Managing Failure in the New Global 
Economy: The U.N .C.I. T.R.A.L. Model Law 
on Cross-border Insolvency 
INTRODUCTION 
The influence of transnational corporations on domestic and inter-
national economies continues to grow.! An inevitable consequence 
of the expansion of transnational enterprises is transnational bank-
ruptcy.2 The recent crisis in the Asian economic markets, and the 
devaluation of the Brazilian currency, are but two examples of the 
potential terrors of the "new economic order" in which transnational 
corporations operate and in which we now live.3 The most spectacular 
cross-border insolvencies involve billions of dollars in debts and assets.4 
The many smaller cases may in the aggregate, however, comprise more 
cross-border financial chaos than their more famous counterparts.5 
I There are as many views on the merits of transnational corporations as there are trees in the 
proverbial forest. See Seymour J. Rubin, Transnational Corporations and International Codes of 
Conduct: A Study of the Relationship Between International Legal Cooperation and Economic Devel-
opment, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 1275, 1276-77 (1995). Although the passion of earlier 
writers-from those hailing the transnational corporation as the engine of progress to those 
predicting dissemination of poverty and cultural dissolution in their wakes-may have diminished 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the triumph of the market economies, the issues 
surrounding the treatment of transnational corporations still command international attention. 
See id. Related to questions surmunding the pmper treatment of transnational corporate gmwth 
are the inevitable questions regarding the pmper administration of transnational corporate 
demise. 
2 See Jay Lawrence Westbmok, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and 
Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 457 (1991). Global recessions, international hostilities, 
fluctuations in the world's financial markets, and poor business management have and will 
continue to cause the insolvency of many multinational companies. See Charles D. Booth, Recog-
nition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Critique of the Inconsistent Approaches of United 
States Courts, 66 AM. BANKR. LJ. 135, 135 (1992). 
3 See, e.g., S. Radelet &J. Sachs, The Onset of the East Asian Crisis, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: 
TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 1231-39 (5th ed. Hal S. Scott & Philip A. Wellons, eds., 
1998);John Barham, Foreign Currency Pours Out of Brazil, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1999, at 1. 
4 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Dellelopments in Transnational Bankruptcy, 39 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 
745,745 (1995). 
5 See id. In fact, according to Professor Westbmok, "[alt both land borders of the United States 
... it appears that hundreds of United States-Mexican and United States- Canadian insolven-
cies-both liquidations and reoganizations-are pending in the U.S. courts at any given time." 
Id. 
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Scholars and practitioners agree that the realm of cross-border in-
solvency law is one of anarchy and chaos.6 Although numerous repara-
tive suggestions have been proposed, none have met with approval by 
a majority of States, much less with universal acceptance.7 The most 
promising solution to the cross-border insolvency fiasco is a recent, 
well-crafted piece of model legislation from the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") appropriately ti-
tled the Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency. 
Part I of this note examines the existing state of cross-border insol-
vency law which sets the stage for the UNCITRAL Model Law and will 
emphasize the most pressing needs and the present philosophical 
approaches to their resolution. Part II provides a brief history of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, followed by 
an exposition of its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency in Part III. 
Part IV of this note analyzes the hypothetical effects of the Model Law 
in operation. This note concludes that the Model Law is a necessary 
and effective step towards managing the failure of transnational cor-
porations in a global economy. 
I. MANAGING CROSS- BORDER INSOLVENCY: RECURRENT THEMES 
A. When Transnational Businesses Fail: Critical Needs 
A transnational insolvency issue arises whenever a multinational 
individual or commercial entity falls into general default on its obliga-
tions.s In the area of transnational insolvencies all parties have an in-
terest in increasing predictability in commercial transactions, enhanc-
ing efficiency in administration of the debtor's estate, and promoting 
fairness in claims acljudicationY In achieving these goals, parties seek 
6 See, e.g., Booth, supra note 2, at 135. 
7 Even attempts at a unified approach between Canada and the United States, two States with 
similar common-law legal systems and parallel economic concerns, have failed. See, e.g., West-
brook, supra note 4, at 745; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Arnerican Law Institute NAFrA Insol-
vency Project, 23 BROOK.]. INT'L L. 7 (1997). 
8 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Cornrnunication, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 
2531,2532 (1996). Although individuals who file bankruptcy and who have assets in more than 
one State also raise cross-border insolvency issues, the Model Law deals only with commercial 
enterprises. See Report of the United Nations Cornrn'n on Int'l Trade Law on the Work of its Thirtieth 
Session, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 30-31," 141-45, U.N. Doc. A/52/17 (1997) 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL 30th Sess.] The scope of this Note is limited accordingly. 
9 See Thomas M. Gaa & Paula E. Garzon, International Creditors' Rights and Bankruptcy, 31 INT'L 
LAw. 273, 273 (1997). 
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to avoid extensive litigation and protracted appeals; unnecessary costs 
and expenses to the debtor's estate; undue delay and inequality in the 
distribution of assets to creditors; and needless duplication of effort by 
courts and other parties. 1O Although details vary from case to case, 
several needs are common to any cross-border insolvency. 
l. The Need to Harmonize the Effect of Insolvency Proceedings 
Initiated in One State on Assets Located in Another 
Most States have legislation that expressly or implicitly intends insol-
vency proceedings commenced in that State to have effect over all the 
debtor's assets, including those located abroad. II The underlying ra-
tionale is that all of the debtor's assets should be available to the 
administrator for establishing a pool of proceeds from which the credi-
tors can be paid. 12 The problem arises when States that claim a univer-
sal effect for their own insolvency proceedings nevertheless deny such 
effect to foreign insolvency proceedings. 13 A parallel issue arises when 
States limit the effect of their own bankruptcy proceedings to assets 
located within their jurisdiction, a self-imposed restriction that hinders 
the access of all creditors to the debtor's assets.14 Even when a State is 
ready to recognize foreign insolvency proceedings, a usual pre-condi-
tion for such recognition is the existence of a substantial link between 
the insolvent debtor and the State of the insolvency proceedings. 15 
Furthermore, some States require the foreign bankruptcy administra-
Just as the fall of a row of dominoes is predictable, so too is the inexorable conse-
quence of fuller and freer world trade, and increasing credit expansion: there will 
inevitably be nonpayment by reason of optimistically miscalculated expectations. Such 
a development calls into question the obstacle to international trade and finance 
occasioned by the anarchy prevailing in transnational insolvencies. 
Gerald T. Dunne, Wanted: An International Insolvency Act, 112 BANKING LJ. 99, 99 (1995); see 
also Daniel M. Glosband & Christopher T. Katucki, Claims and Priorities in Ancillary Proceedings 
under Section 304, 17 BROOK.]. INT'L L. 477, 477 (1991) ("Resolution and, optimistically, payment 
of creditor claims is the sine qua non of bankruptcy proceedings in all countries."). 
10 See, e.g., Charles D. Booth, A History of the Transnational Aspects of United States Bankruptcy 
Law Prior to the Bankruptcy RPform Act of 1978, 9 B.U. INT'L LJ. 1, 36-37 (1991) (quoting list of 
objectives sought in cross-border insolvencies). 
11 See Cross-border Insolvency, U.N. COlllm. on Int'l Trade, 26th Sess., Addendum, at 3, ~ 11, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/378/ Add.4 (1993) [hereinafter UNCITRAL 26th. Sess.]. Some States' laws, 
however, are territorially limited and thus have no effect beyond their own borders. See id. 
12 See id. at 4, ~ 12. 
13 See id. at 4, n 12-13. 
14 See id. at 4, ~ 12. 
15 See id. at 4, n 8, 14. 
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tor to obtain formal recognition in the State's own court in order for 
the foreign insolvency proceeding to be given any local effect. 16 
The inability to coordinate or harmonize the effects of insolvency 
proceedings initiated in one State on assets located in another has 
serious practical consequences. Fundamental bankruptcy principles, 
such as a moratorium on creditor action (known as a "stay" in U.S. 
vernacular), although presen t in most national bankruptcy systems, fail 
as between States. 17 Some scholars have argued that the adoption of 
an automatic or nearly automatic moratorium procedure in each State 
in response to a foreign bankruptcy filing is the single most important 
reform that could be achieved in transnational insolvency cases. 18 Such 
a moratorium would ensure court control in each country.19 It would 
prevent piece-meal dismemberment of the debtor's estate, allow time 
for vital communication between the courts involved (assuming courts 
are permitted to communicate) and provide a quiet opportunity in 
which private agreements-subject to court approval-could be nego-
tiated between various creditors, and between the creditors and the 
debtor. 20 Absent an international convention, bilateral treaty, or uni-
form legislation adopted by many States the effectiveness of one State's 
moratorium on a debtor's assets is limited to assets within its own 
territory.21 Universal application of even basic bankruptcy principles 
depends on the often unpredictable level of cooperation granted by a 
foreign State's judiciary.22 
16 See UNCITRAL 26th Sess., supra note 11, at 4, ~ 15. 
17 See Westbrook, supra note 4, at 754. ("Generally, the moratorium halts lawsuits and other 
legal actions against the debtor and its property, although secured creditors and other favored 
parties are allowed to proceed in some jurisdictions."). 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 See id.; see also Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991) (permitting trustee to avoid 
prebankruptcy transfers discourages creditors from racing to courthouse to dismember debtor 
during his slide into bankruptcy); In reJohnson, 8 B.R. 371, 374 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981) (purpose 
of bankruptcy is providing equal opportunity for all creditors to share in the assets of the debtor 
available for distribution; stay designed to prevent piecemeal dismemberment of the debtor's 
assets by creditors); In re Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 207 B.R. 282, 284 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) 
(fundamental principles of Chapter 11 include desire to maximize value of estate for benefit of 
all creditors, to promote equal distribution among creditors, and to avoid piecemeal, preferential 
dismemberment ofa debtor's assets); In re Axona Int'I Credit and Commerce, Ltd., 88 B.R. 597, 
609 (Bankr. S.D.N.V. 1988) (granting of comity to foreign bankruptcy proceeding enables assets 
of debtor to be dispersed in equitable, orderly, and systematic manner, rather than in a hap-
hazard, erratic or piecemeal fashion). 
21 See Westbrook, supra note 4, at 754; see, e.g., UNCITRAL 26th Sess., supra note 11, at 3-4, 
" 11-16. 
22 See Westbrook, supra note 4, at 746; see generally In re Axona, 88 B.R. at 609. 
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The lack of uniform effect of bankruptcy proceedings initiated in 
one State on assets located in another creates other serious problems. 
The standing and title of the liquidator, administrator, or trustee of the 
bankruptcy estate is uncertain. 23 In several nations, the process of 
obtaining standing is time-consuming and complex.24 Furthermore, a 
liquidator's appearance in a foreign court may expose the liquidator 
to personal jurisdiction.25 In a transnational insolvency proceeding, if 
the liquidator from one State seeks to enjoin action against the debtor 
in a foreign State, the cumbersome recognition process may mean the 
loss of valuable assets for general distribution as the liquidator loses 
the race to the courthouse stairs, waiting patiently for consular recog-
nition of her future standing. 
A closely related issue concerns the extent of the liquidator's powers 
once she has obtained the right to bring suit in the foreign court. 26 In 
almost all bankruptcy systems, the liquidator acquires important rights 
to the debtor's property as a result of the bankruptcy filing. 27 The 
liquidator generally obtains some control over the debtor's property, 
and also, the right to defend pre-existing lawsuits against the debtor 
and its estate. 2R The extent to which a liquidator'S powers under one 
bankruptcy system are transferable to actions in another State's juris-
diction relating to the same debtor is unresolved. 29 
23 See UNCITRAL 26th Sess., supra note 11, at 4, 'l[ 15; Westbrook, supra note 4, at 754. 
24 See UNCITRAL 26th Sess., supra note 11, at 4, 'l[ 11. 
25 In fact, this very issue was one of the precipitating factors of the U.S. adoption of § 304 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. See Booth, supra note 10, at 1. Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
(the "Code"), the U.S. courts responded inconsistently over the years to issues involving the 
recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and the claims of foreign representatives. See id. 
at 1-3; Stuart A. Krauss et aI., Relief Under Section 304 of the Banhruptcy Code: ClarifYing the 
Principal Role of Comity in Transnational Insolvencies, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2591, 2594 (1996). 
Following the 1973 oil embargo, the need for reform became obviolls in the aftermath of the 
insolvency of three major international financial players. See Krauss et aI., supra, at 2594-95. The 
first of the three cases involved Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt K.G.a.A. ("Herstatt"), a major V\'est German 
commercial bank with millions of dollars on deposit in the United States. See id. When Herstatt 
failed, Chase Manhattan Bank froze more than $50 million of Herstatt's assets. See id. A mad 
scramble for Herstatt's assets ensued as the German liquidator stayed out of the United States to 
avoid being subject to personal jurisdiction, and withering pretrial discovery followed. See id. The 
parties eventually settled without a final decision on their pending bankruptcy appeal, leaving 
the distinct impression that the system surrounding transnational insolvencies needed urgent 
reform. See id. 
26 See Westbrook, supra note 4, at 755. 
27 See id. at 754-55. 
28 See id. at 755. This ensures that default judgments and collusion are avoided. See id. 
29 See generally id. 
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2. The Need to Promote Cross-border Judicial Cooperation and 
to Share Information 
At presen t, there is no uniform set of rules or practices relating to 
court assistance in cross-border insolvencies.30 When insolvency pro-
ceedings are initiated in one State, the liquidator of the debtor's assets, 
or an interested creditor, may require assistance from a foreign court. 31 
Some States do not entertain formal requests for assistance by foreign 
liquidators, necessitating the filing of a full-blown local bankruptcy.32 
Other States have rules that specifically address court assistance.33 Yet 
other States have no specific rules and judicial cooperation proceeds 
on an unpredictable, ad hoc basis.34 The efficient and equitable admini-
stration of a transnational debtor's estate, and concomitantly, the terms 
of international trade and finance, are adversely affected by this lack 
of uniformity (or anarchy, as some commentators have more boldly 
stated) in judicial rules and procedure.35 
Basic communication between the courts involved in a transnational 
insolvency is clearly important for the efficient administration of the 
debtor's estate.36 Most countries require extensive disclosures from the 
debtor, especially regarding the nature of its financial affairs, which for 
the sake of administrative expediency should be available to the courts 
(and parties) in each interested jurisdiction.37 Along similar lines, ade-
quate notice to interested parties, including foreign creditors, is a 
necessary element of any efficient administration of a global insol-
vency.38 A reliable mechanism for the dissemination of such basic 
information is needed.39 
30 See id. at 745; see also UNCITRAL 26th Sess., supra note 11, at 4, , 18. 
31 See UNCITRAL 26th Sess., supra note 11, at 4,' 17. The assistance requested will vary fmm 
case to case and may include turning over assets to the foreign liquidator; publicizing foreign 
insolvency pmceedings; suspending a creditor's legal action against the debtor that would, 
contrary to the principle of equality among creditors, diminish the debtor's estate; or challenging 
preferential transfers of pmperty or transfers alleged to be fraudulent. See id. 
32 See id. at 5" 18. 
33 See id. 
34 See id. at 5, , 19. 
35 See Dunne, supra note 9, at 99. 
36 See Westbmok, supra note 4, at 755. 
37 See id. 
38 See id. 
39 See id. 
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3. The Need for Creditor Participation 
Because resolution and payment of creditor claims is fundamental 
to every State's insolvency proceeding, nearly every State has devices 
for creditor involvement in the process.40 The greatest challenge to 
creditor involvement in cross-border insolvencies stems from the dif-
ferential treatment of local and foreign creditors, often to the foreign 
creditor's detriment.41 Discriminatory treatment is most evident when 
a foreign creditor's claim is relegated to a lesser priority regardless of 
its status under the domestic law, or in its home State, merely because 
it is a foreign c1aim.42 The reasons for this treatment are apparent. 
Insolvency regimes are closed systems of loss allocation that distribute 
insolvency proceeds according to a pre-determined hierarchy.43 This 
means that every cent paid to one party translates into one cent less 
for another. 44 Basic principles of national self-interest dictate a discrimi-
natory attitude towards non-domestic claims, i.e., any State could de-
termine under its domestic law that foreign creditors are entitled to 
be paid last, if at all, from the proceeds of a domestic insolvency 
proceeding. A nondiscriminatory rule on the treatment of foreign 
creditors so that foreign creditors are treated like local creditors in all 
respects in cross-border insolvencies may be a noble, but elusive, goa1. 45 
The issues with claim status and priority, however, extend beyond 
blatant discrimination based on the nationality of the particular credi-
tor.46 The challenge in cross-border insolvencies arises because the 
40 See id.; Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 477. 
41 See Westbrook, supra note 4, at 755; Gaa & Garzon, supra note 9, at 280-81; Glosband & 
Katucki, supra note 9, at 480. ("Bankmptc)' proceedings of a multinational debtor add a refractive 
layer of issues to the consideration of claims. Assets and creditors may be located in countries 
which have different laws regarding the avoidance of preferential or fraudulent transfers to 
creditors, the recognition of certain types of liens, priority accorded certain unsecured claims, or 
the recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings or foreign creditors."} Issues relating to the 
method and timing of the notice that must be given to foreign creditors by the court at the 
commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding, for example, are unresolved. See Gaa & Garzon, 
supra note 9, at 281. The status of foreign tax claims and social security authorities has also 
presented fundamental problems. See id. States naturally balk at having to pay a foreign State's 
revenue claims from proceeds of a local liquidation at the expense of its local creditors. See id. 
42 See Gaa & Garzon, supra note 9, at 281; Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 481. 
43 See generally Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Pri-
ority and New Value Contribution, 36 EMORY LJ. 1009 (l987) (discussing U.S. bankruptcy structure 
as loss allocation system). 
44 See id. 
45 See Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 481. 
46 See Gaa & Garzon, supra note 9, at 281; Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 480-81. 
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definitions and priority ranking of claims vary greatly from State to 
StateY Thus, even if a foreign claim were admitted to the same or 
equivalent class in a local proceeding as the foreign creditor would 
have enjoyed in its home State, treatment of the foreign creditor may 
nevertheless be substantially different if the class to which it is admitted 
is less favored in the local proceeding.48 The United States Bankruptcy 
Code for example, divides claims into three general categories-se-
cured, priority, and unsecured.49 Each category is defined and paid 
according to a specified priority ranking that reflects United States 
social and political objectives.50 It is unlikely that another State will 
share the same policy goals in its insolvency distribution scheme. Thus 
a creditor's claim that enjoys high priority and consequently substantial 
likelihood of payment under the U.S. Code may have no priority and 
nominal dividend in a foreign proceeding.51 And as one commentator 
remarked, "[ilt is important to note that this priority/preference prob-
lem includes as a major component the question of the rights of 
secured creditors. "52 
4. The Need for Consistent Application of Choice of Law and 
Choice of Forum Rules 
Most States lack a formally articulated choice of law and choice of 
forum for resolving cross-border insolvencies.53 Choice of law and fo-
rum are the basis for the two threshold decisions any State encounters 
when resolving a cross-border insolvency case: (1) what is the national 
body of law that will govern the financial consequences of the default? 
and (2) what public institution in one or more countries will govern 
the default?54 
47 SeeGaa & Garzon, supra note 9, at 281. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code, for example, unlike many 
other systems, recognizes contingent claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (4) (1994) (definition of claim). 
Thus a U.S. creditor's contingent claim would be valid in a U.S. proceeding, but may not be 
recognized abroad. If the debtor files in a jurisdiction that does not recognize contingent claims, 
the U.S. creditor, absent the initiation of a domestic proceeding, is left with little or no recourse. 
48 See Gaa & Garzon, supra note 9, at 281. Thus for example, a claim by a commercial fisherman 
debtor who enjoys special priority in a U.S. proceeding and who is likely to receive a high dividend 
on his or her claim, jnay be relegated to non-priority in a foreign proceeding that has no special 
rule promoting the debtor's interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6) (1994). 
49 See Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 478; 11 U.S.C. § 101 (4) (1994) (defining claim). 
50 See Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 478-79. 
51 See id. 
52 Westbrook, supra note 4, at 756. 
53 See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 459. 
54 See id. 
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The insolvency of a multinational entity will routinely require several 
choices oflaw and fora. 55 The most significant choice oflaw issues are: 
(l) formal versus informal resolution of the financial crisis; (2) liqui-
dation versus reorganization of the entity; (3) distribution of the estate; 
and (4) avoidance of certain transactions.56 Similarly, management of 
a transnational insolvency proceeding will invoke choice of forum 
issues because assets in various jurisdictions cannot be managed with-
out the assistance, or acquiescence, of a local authority in each juris-
diction. 57 
Presently no reasoned choice of law analysis governs and coopera-
tion between States is rare. 5R Debtors and creditors use the lack of 
established choices as strategic devices to maximize their interests in 
bankruptcy. Thus even in a case such as In re Maxwell Communications 
Corp.,59 cited for its high level of international cooperation and har-
monization, choice of law and forum issues remain unresolved.GO It 
involved the dissolution of the global publishing empire of Robert 
Maxwell. 61 The corporation was unusual in that it had its true "seat" of 
operation in London, where it was administered and where nearly all 
of its financial affairs were managed, but its principal assets were 
located in the United States.G2 This corporate structure resulted in dual 
proceedings: an insolvency administration in the United Kingdom and 
a chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States.53 Although the United 
States bankruptcy judge refused to dismiss the chapter 11 proceedings, 
she did provide unprecedented cooperation to the British administra-
tors.64 One significant piece of litigation, however, involved a classic 
choice of law (and forum) issue notwithstanding a negotiated forum 
selection clause in the parties' trade contracts.65 
The choice of law issue concerned the burden of proof in a prefer-
ence action. The British liquidator sought to avoid several transfers 
55 See id. 
56 See id. at 459-60. 
57 See id. at 460. 
58 See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2534. 
59 See 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996). 
60 See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2534 (citing In re Maxwell as "one of the most important 
transnational insolvencies of modern times"). 
61 See In re Maxwell, 93 F.3d at 1040. 
62 See id. 
m See id. 
64 See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2534. 
65 See In re Maxwell, 93 F.3d at 1040-41. 
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made by the debtor to British banks prior to bankruptcy. 56 Although 
the transfers were within the United Kingdom, were made to British 
banks and to the London branch of a French bank, and were made by 
a debtor with its principal place of business in Britain, the liquidator 
sought to apply United States bankruptcy preference law.57 The strate-
gic reason was straightforward: establishing that the transfers were 
preferential payments involved a lesser burden of proof under U.S. 
law.58 Even though it appeared evident that British law should have 
applied to the transfers, the liquidators argued that (1) most of the 
debtor's assets were in the United States; and (2) certain of the moneys 
paid in the transfers had come from liquidation of U.S. assets.69 The 
U.S. court dismissed the preference action holding that the debtor's 
contacts with the United States were insufficient to overcome the many 
elements of the transaction connected with the United Kingdom. 70 
Although the court reached the "right" outcome based on a conflicts 
of law analysis,71 the question of which law to apply to a simple bank-
ruptcy preference involved extensive litigation in both U.S. and U.K. 
courts. A clear choice of law rule incorporated into the State's insol-
vency system could have avoided the expense and delay of the litiga-
tion.n This has proved to be sufficiently intricate so that even the 
drafters of the Model Law have chosen not to address it directly. 
The lack of substantial progress in the choice of law and choice of 
forum areas imposes significant costs on transnational enterprise.73 In 
66 See id. at lO42-43. 
67 See id. at 1043; Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2537. 
f~ See In re Maxwell, 93 F.3d at 1043. Under U.S. law, a trustee may avoid certain transfers to 
outside creditors made within ninety days before the filing ofa bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 547(b) (1994). Transfers that place transferees, ifleft unchecked, in a better position than other 
creditors upon the debtor's insolvency are referred to as preferences, and may be avoided by the 
trustee for the benefit of all creditors generally. See In re Maxwell, 93 F.3d at 1043. According to 
the court, the corresponding provision in English law is similar to the U.S. law but imposes an 
additional condition-it limits avoidance to those situations where placing the transferee in a 
better position was something the debtor intended. See id. The U.K. liquidators in In re Maxwell 
sought to litigate the debtors' transfers under U.S. law because the intent requirement in English 
law would have presented a significant or insurmountable obstacle. See id. 
69 See In re Maxwell, 93 F.3d at 1054--55; Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2537. 
70 See In re Maxwell, 93 F.3d at 1054-55. 
71 The court's conflict of laws analysis is sufficiently esoteric to be beyond the scope of this note. 
See id. at 1046--47. For a more detailed analysis see generally Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2538. 
72 A fixed choice of law rule may prejudice local interests in particular cases. Theoretically, 
however, such a rule would increase values available to all local interests over time in all general 
defaults so as to offset the losses that a particular local interest might suffer in one case. See 
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 465-66. 
73 See id. at 460. 
1999] CRoss-BoRDER INSOLVENCY 393 
addition to direct litigation expenses, the inability to predict the results 
of default imposes costS.74 This capricious state of affairs adds to the 
cost of international transactions, particularly to the cost of interna-
tional financings. 75 Another significant cost arises in the insolvency 
process itself. The present incoherent system destroys values that would 
otherwise be available to claimants in the enterprise.76 Piecemeal dis-
memberment of a multinational enterprise, without regard to the 
natural economic units of sale, may greatly lessen the prices obtained 
for the assets and may lower the return available to claimants. 77 
5. Other Unresolved Needs in Cross-Border Insolvencies 
Choice of law and choice of forum issues are intensified by avoid-
ance powers. 78 Unlike ordinary choice of law conflicts regulating the 
scope of any given transaction,79 the question of what law should apply 
to determine whether a certain transaction is avoidable is inextricably 
tied to the legal governance of the entire proceeding. so The laws gov-
erning avoidance powers-the ability of the bankruptcy administrator 
to undo certain transactions to increase the assets available for distri-
74 See id. 
75 See id.; see also Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Tmnsnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. 
J. INT'L L. I, 1 (1997) (arguing that lack of consistency in choice of law issues decreases efficiency 
and is detrimental to social welfare). 
76 See Westbrook, supm note 2, at 460-61. 
77 See id. at 460-61; Rasmussen, supm note 75, at 4--5. 
78 See Westbrook, supm note 4, at 756. Like choice of law issues in general, the Model Law 
largely avoids the issue of avoidance powers, although it does grant standing to raise the issue. 
See infra note 234 and accompanying text. 
79 A case illustration demonstrates the distinction. In In re Koreag, a Swiss company filed for 
bankruptcy in Switzerland. See Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. v. Refco FIX Assocs., Inc. (In re 
Koreag, Controle et Revision, S.A.) , 961 F.2d 341, 344--46 (2d Cir. 1992). The Swiss firm, Mebco, 
was engaged in cunency transactions with a U.S. party, Refco, at the time of the filing. See id. A 
suit initiated by the Swiss liquidator ensued in the U.S. bankruptcy court regarding the transfer 
of certain monies in Mebco's New York accounts, including monies that would have been paid 
to Refco absent the bankruptcy. See id. at 346--47. Although arguably relying on the wrong choice 
of law and forum, see Westbrook, supm note 4, at 748, the U.S. Court had to resolve general issues 
regarding property and title of the disputed funds. See In re Koreag, 961 F.2d at 348, 350-52. The 
question of ownership, which laws regulate the effect of contracts, and which State's procedures 
for perfecting security interests should be followed are standard choice of law issues that arise in 
almost every cross-border insolvency case. See Westbrook, supm note 4, at 748. In In re Koreag, 
the U.S. court remanded the case for a determination of whether a constructive trust-under 
New York law- should be imposed upon the disputed funds, thereby removing them from 
jurisdiction of the Swiss proceedings. See 961 F.2d at 355. 
80 See Westbrook, supra note 4, at 748, 756. 
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bution to general creditors-reflect domestic beliefs and values.8l The 
priority granted to perfected security interests in the United States, for 
example, is not present in many European insolvency laws. Deciding 
which State's avoidance powers to apply, therefore, invokes policy de-
cisions that are absent in standard choice of law decisions regarding 
simple contracts and property rights.82 All avoidance powers, including 
fraudulent transfer laws and preference laws, raise policy concerns not 
just limited to the preference issues raised in the In re Maxwell case.83 
Another unresolved issue in cross-border insolvency law is what type 
of entity should be covered by cross-border insolvency legislation. Are 
natural persons (i.e., human beings) or only legal persons (e.g., cor-
porations) eligible for relief? One commentator has noted that: 
The bankruptcies of natural persons implicate virtually every 
aspect of a nation's laws and social policies, far more than do 
proceedings involving corporations. The financial failure of 
human beings may be deeply intertwined with domestic and 
family laws, including divorce, custody, and support. Ques-
tions of exempt property and personal discharge inevitably 
arise, along with problems of criminal responsibility. These 
and many other issues are treated very differently under the 
laws of different countries and the policies underlying them 
are both fundamental and fraught with the deepest emo-
tional and moral concerns.84 
The effect States give to bankruptcy discharges granted in another 
State, whether for an individual or business filing, is also unsettled.85 
SimIlarly, controversy surrounds the determination of whom should 
run the debtor's affairs during (and after) a bankruptcy proceeding.86 
States take different approaches regarding who controls the day-to-day 
decision-making process while the entity is in bankruptcy, how to treat 
incomplete contracts which have not been fully performed, and the 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 75, at 13. 
84Westbl'Ook, supra note 4, at 757. 
85 See id. at 756. In a recent German case, a German court gave legal effect in Germany to the 
discharge of a Swiss citizen. See Decision of May 27, 1993, IX ZR 254/92, discussed in Cristoph G. 
Paulus, A New German Decision on International Insolvency Law, 41 AM. J. COMPo L. 667 (1994). 
The discharge had been granted in a Swiss bankruptcy pl'Oceeding under the new Swiss insolvency 
law; the German court's recognition of the foreign State's discharge was unprecedented. See id. 
86 See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 75, at 14. 
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source of compensation for administrative and legal expenses.87 Cor-
porate reorganization, a concept that the U.S. takes for granted, is by 
no means accepted as sound policy in other States.88 And even if two 
States could agree on the criteria under which a business is allowed to 
reorganize, the question of who should manage the reorganization 
remains unclear. Under U.S. law, for example, absent a court order to 
the contrary, the debtor's current managers are left in charge of its 
affairs while the entity attempts to restructure.89 English law, in con-
trast, allows for the appointment of an administrator who has the 
power to displace the current management if he so chooses. gO 
The creation of a cross-filing or marshaling provision would also 
benefit cross-border insolvency cases.gl Such a rule would limit a credi-
tor's recovery in any given proceeding by factoring in amounts the 
creditor has already recovered in a proceeding in another jurisdic-
tion.92 Cross-filing would permit the liquidator in each proceeding to 
file in every other proceeding on behalf of all creditors represented 
by the liquidator in the initial proceeding.9~ 
B. Existing Approaches to Cross-border Insolvencies: Universality and 
Territoriality 
There are essentially two analytical theories of cross-border insol-
vency: the "universality" approach, and the "territoriality" approach. 94 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See Westbrook, supra note 4, at 755. 
92 See id. Thus for example, in a cross-border insolvency case, if Debtor X owed Bank B a total 
of $100,000, Bank B would be limited to recovering no more than other creditors in its class, 
regardless of the jurisdiction in which Bank B pursued Debtor X. If Bank B were able to recover 
$20,000 on its claim in the United States, and $40,000 on its claim in the United Kingdom, and 
the total dividend for creditors similarly situated is $60,000, then Bank B would not be allowed 
to recover an additional $40,000 in a German court, merely because it filed suit faster than other 
creditors. See II U.S.C. § 508 (1994). 
93 See Westbrook, supra note 4, at 755-56. 
94 See Todd Kraft & Allison Aranson, Transnational Banllruptcies: Section 304 and Beyond, 1993 
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 329, 336--38 (1993) (citing territoriality and universality as two approaches); 
Krauss et al., supra note 25, at 2592-93 (arguing that universality and territoriality are subservient 
to primary question of whether to extend comity under U.S. bankruptcy code); Glosband & 
Katucki, supra note 9, at 479-82 (doctrine of territoriality, also known as pluralism, and doctrine 
of universality are two primary extant philosophies of transnational insolvency); Booth, supra 
note 10, at 4 (scholars have developed two approaches to cross-border insolvency issues, the 
universality approach which includes "personalist" and "unity," and the territoriality approach 
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The universality approach favors a single, unified distribution of the 
debtor's assets from one central forum. 95 One jurisdiction retains the 
primary duty to resolve the debtor's financial difficulties and addition-
ally coordinates the actions in other jurisdictions in aid of its central-
ized proceeding.96 The territoriality approach emphasizes the rights of 
local creditors and follows the strict rule of sovereignty.97 The doctrine 
interprets the rule of sovereignty to require that the authority of one 
State, including its bankruptcy laws and proceedings, should be con-
fined to its own territoryYs Under strict application of this theory, each 
State conducts its own bankruptcy proceeding with respect to the assets 
located within its jurisdiction and disregards any parallel proceedings 
in foreign jurisdictionsY9 Although some modern cases reflect a strong 
and growing momentum towards universality,100 territoriality is histori-
cally the predominant philosophy espoused by States, and even States 
which exhibit support of universalityHIl apply territorial principles on 
an ad hoc basis. 102 
l. Territoriality-Its Scope and Application 
Under a territorial system, when a transnational business entity files 
bankruptcy, each State distributes the value of the debtor's property 
located within its own jurisdiction.!03 Territoriality-based States do not 
recognize the legitimacy of foreign insolvency proceedings, or recog-
nize them in limited respects with minimal effect. 104 The court in each 
State grabs the assets within its borders and administers those assets 
with little regard to any foreign proceeding involving the same debt-
or. 105 The territoriality approach is based on numerous factors, includ-
which includes "realist" and "plurality" monikers); Harold S. Burman, Harmonization of Interna-
tional Bankruptcy Law: A United States Perspective, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2543, 2549 (1996) 
(suggesting three approaches: "universalist" approach, "unity" approach, and "territoriality" ap-
proach). 
95 See Burman, supra note 94, at 2549; Krauss et aI., supra note 25, at 2591-92. 
96 See Burman, supra note 94, at 2549; Krauss et. aI., supra note 25, at 2591-92. 
97 See Burman, supra note 94, at 2552; Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 480. 
98 See Burman, supra note 94, at 2552; Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 480. 
99 See Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 480. 
100 See Westbrook, supra note 4, at 750-51. 
101 Such as, arguably, the United States in § 304 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C § 304 
(1994). 
102 See Burman, supra note 94, at 2551-52; Westbrook, supra note 4, at 748. 
103 See Kraft & Aranson, supra note 94, at 337. 
104 See Burman, supra note 94, at 2551. 
105 See Kraft & Aranson, supra note 94, at 336; Rasmussen, supra note 75, at 2. 
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ing the court's perceived duty to protect local creditors or the debtor, 
the need to protect the local jurisdiction of the courts, administrators 
and trustees, and the historically grounded general objections to ex-
traterritorial application of foreign laws and recognition of foreign 
representatives. lOG 
Local creditors favor territoriality because it produces predictable 
results that preserve the integrity of the local system.107 Claims, liens 
and priorities are applied according to local laws and policies, and local 
creditors do not have to travel far to attach property. 108 Application of 
the territoriality principle, however, often results in the unfair and 
uneven treatment of creditors. 109 Moreover, it sacrifices international 
cooperation,110 rejects the principle of equality of distribution in favor 
of a regime that rewards the fastest moving creditor,lll and generates 
a multiplicity of bankruptcy proceedings and duplicative administra-
tive expenses. 112 
A modern application of territoriality appears in In re Toga Manu-
facturing ("Toga'), a case in which the U.S. bankruptcy court failed to 
recognize the laws of a foreign proceeding in favor of local in terests. 113 
In Toga, a Canadian debtor petitioned the U.S. court for an injunction 
against all the debtor's creditors in the United States, and a turnover 
order for certain funds that were held in a Michigan bankruptcy court 
106 See Booth, supra note 10, at 138; Burman, supra note 94, at 2552. 
107 See Dunne, supra note 9, at 99 ("First to be settled should be the conflict between territori-
ality and centrality-hopefully in favor of the former"); Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 480; 
Rasmussen, supra note 75, at 5-6. 
108 See Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 480-81. 
109 See id. at 481. 
110 See id. 
111 See Booth, supra note 10, at 5. 
112 See id.; Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 481. A classic illustration of the territoriality 
approach is that advocated by Chief Justice Marshall in Harrison v. Sterry. 9 U.S. 289 (1809). 
Justice Marshall based his holding favoring the domestic creditors on the fact that the "bankruptcy 
law of a foreign country is incapable of operating a legal transfer of property in the United States." 
Id. at 302. The conclusion followed from the territorial principle that the "United States [is] not 
deprived of ... priority [in applying its laws] ... by the circumstance that the contract was made 
in a foreign country." Id. at 299; see also Booth, supra note 10, at 7-8 (complete analysis and 
development of classical territoriality). The prevailing classic view of territoriality was justified by 
the potentially prejudicial effects on the interests of local creditors by the operation of foreign 
laws under the universality approach. See id. at 7-8. Under this view, transnational insolvency 
problems should be resolved in accordance with principles of comity, but "only so far as may be 
done without impairing the remedies, or lessening the securities, which [domestic] laws have 
provided for [domestic] citizens." Id. (quoting J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS §§ 403-409, at 565-75 (8th ed. 1883)). 
113 See In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165 (E.D.Mich. 1983). 
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subject to an attachment lien by a local U.S. creditor.ll4 The bankruptcy 
court denied the debtor's motion. ll5 The Toga court reasoned that 
relief was not available because the U.S. creditor's claim under U.S. 
law would be one of the first to receive payment, in contrast to the 
creditor's treatment under Canadian law where it would most likely be 
just an "ordinary creditor" without secured status. ll6 Although the 
court recognized the universality principles embodied in the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code,117 it relied on classic territoriality-based doctrines to 
reach its holding favoring the U.S. creditor.ll8 "Under this theory," the 
court stated, "any country is free to entertain proceedings pursuant to 
their [sic] bankruptcy laws without regard to any foreign judgment. "119 
The court concluded that it "must protect United States citizens' claims 
against foreign judgments inconsistent with [the U.S.'s] well-defined 
and accepted policies," and that the Canadian debtor's request there-
fore had to be denied.120 
Although most scholars agree that universality is the preferable ap-
proach to resolving cross-border insolvency issues,121 at least one author 
(and creditors) argue in favor of territoriality.122 One modern territo-
riality-based theory suggests that the choice of applicable insolvency 
law should be determined by the owners of the firms, i.e., placed in 
the private domain. 123 The following beliefs underlie this hypothesis: 
(1) private international law is built on the concept of voluntary agree-
ment between parties; (2) contracting parties are often allowed more 
freedom in the international realm than in the domestic realm; and 
(3) this principle of private contractual choice should be extended to 
the selection of insolvency rules. 124 Thus, because existing private in-
ternational law generally recognizes the validity of forum-selection 
114 See id. at 167. For a thorough discussion of the Toga case, see generally Booth, supra note 
2, at 184-192. 
Jl5 See In re Toga, 28 B.R. at 170-7l. 
Jl6 See id. at 170. 
117 See id. at 167-68 ("Section 304 of the Code ... embodies universal theory of conflicts of 
laws with some qualifications"). 
JIB See id. at 167. 
Jl9Id. 
120 In re Toga, 28 B.R. at 170. 
121 See, e.g., Booth, supra note 2, at 5; Burman, supra note 94, at 2549; Glosband & Katucki, 
supra note 9, at 479-82; Kraft & Aranson, supra note 94, at 336-38; Krauss et aI., supra note 25, 
at 2592-93. 
122 See generally Dunne, supra note 9; Rasmussen, supra note 75. 
123 See Rasmussen, supra note 75, at 4-6. 
124 See id. 
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clauses and choice of law clauses in private contracts, extending such 
recognition notwithstanding an insolvency proceeding is justified be-
cause it generates greater predictability in international trade and 
maximizes firm efficiency and social welfare. 125 Under this approach to 
cross-border insolvency, firms would have a menu of insolvency re-
gimes from which they could choose, a choice that would be made at 
incorporation and which could be amended as the structure of the 
firm changed over time. 126 Although businesses may differ as to which 
set of insolvency rules are most efficient, under this menu-based sys-
tem, market forces would, over time, produce optimal diversity.127 
Under this menu-based bankruptcy theory, the resolution of the 
cross-border insolvency problem should not focus on the contours of 
the optimal menu or on which single default insolvency rule should 
govern all proceedings, but rather, should focus on the question of 
which set of insolvency rules should be offered to multinational 
firms.128 Firm choice would, and should, replace government man-
date. 129 "For many firms the territorial approach may actually provide 
a superior set of insolvency rules. Moreover, the territorial approach 
may be able to replicate procedural universality when it is appropriate 
to do so. On balance, one cannot conclude that one approach domi-
nates the other. Empirical evidence is needed to ascertain the types of 
multinational firms which encounter financial distress. "130 
125 See id. 'The owners of firms, not governments, are better positioned to select the insolvency 
rule which best maximizes firm value." [d. at 4-5. 
126 See id. at 5, 19-22. 
127 Accordingly, the choice of insolvency law to be applied should be left to market forces 
because legislatures are limited in their ability to generate efficient solutions. See Rasmussen, 
supra note 75, at 5. Legislatures must pass laws affecting a broad range of interests and are 
therefore unable to engage in the critical cost-benefit analysis used by individual firms assessing 
the efficiency of any set of insolvency rules. See id. This theoretical approach assumes that there 
are essentially two institutions which are potential candidates for selecting insolvency rules, i.e., 
the market represented by the owners of businesses, and the government, represented by the 
legislature; the market has a clear advantage over the government because it alone can accurately 
ascertain the price of different insolvency rules. See id. 
128 See Rasmussen, supra note 75, at 26. 
129 See id. Such a general rule fulfills the expectations of tht' pan it's and allows them to ascertain 
with relative ct'ltainty what their rights will be under the contract. See id. This theory is territori-
ality-based because it condones the application of local substantive law to assets located within a 
State's jurisdiction, rather than promoting the concept of a centralized forum. Finn choice, 
although ideally left unfettered to the greatest extent possible, would not be completely unregu-
lated. See id. A corporation would not be allowed to select one country as the forum for the 
dispute, and then be able to specifY the application of another country's bankruptcy law. See id. 
Subject to this restriction, however, a corporation would be allowed to specify which country or 
countries should administer its affairs if it encounters financial distress. See id. at 26-27. 
130 Rasmussen, supra note 75, at 26. 
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2. Universality-Its Scope and Application 
There are several variations of the universality approach. 131 In its 
most pristine form, the pure universality approach has as its objective 
the development of a common insolvency regime among nations.132 
This would result in a single administrator for a cross-border proceed-
ing, or a principal administrator who would coordinate the actions of 
all forums. 133 The debtor's assets and interests would be administered 
under this unified regime, thereby vitiating the need for multiple 
proceedings, duplicative administrative expenses, and unequal treat-
ment of similarly situated classes of creditors. 134 Although such a uni-
fied approach sounds like an attractive panacea, as a practical matter, 
it would require that the bankruptcy laws of all States be substantially 
similar, if not identical, or that each secondary State defer entirely to 
the primary State's insolvency proceeding.135 Both events are unlikely 
to occur in the near future. 
Under a pragmatically modified universality approach, the goal is to 
simplifY and unifY a cross-border insolvency to the greatest extent 
possible. 136 A central bankruptcy proceeding, often referred to as the 
"main proceeding," is initiated in the jurisdiction in which the debtor 
is domiciled or has its principle place of business. 137 The bankruptcy 
trustee or liquidator from the main proceeding attempts to collect all 
of the debtor's assets worldwide, and seeks the turnover of all such 
assets to the main proceeding. 138 To do so, the trustee travels abroad 
and commences ancillary proceedings in each State in which the 
debtor's assets are located. 139 In each of the ancillary proceedings, the 
foreign State's court gives effect to the declaration of bankruptcy in 
the main proceeding, recognizes the claims of the trustee, orders the 
turnover of all local assets to the main proceeding, and applies the 
substantive laws of the country in which the main proceeding is being 
131 See id. at 16; see also sources cited supra note 94. 
132 See Burman, supra note 94, at 2550-52. Imagine, if you will, a unified law on bankruptcy, 
comparable to Article 9 of the U.C.C. with regards to its effects, but with global application, 
adopted uniformly by all nations. 
133 See Booth, supra note 2, at 5; Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 481-82. 
134 See Booth, supra note 2, at 5; Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 481-82. 
135 See Booth, supra note 2, at 5; Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 481-82. 
136 See Booth, supra note 2, at 5; see also sources cited supra note 94. 
137 See Booth, supra note 2, at 4. 
138 See id. 
139 See id. 
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administered. 140 All creditors worldwide should submit claims solely in 
the main proceeding.141 
One of the primary advantages of the universality approach is that 
creditors of the same class would be treated alike. 142 Because all claims 
are resolved and all distributions to creditors are made from a unified 
estate, creditors of the same class would be treated alike, regardless of 
nationality.143 Other advantages of the universality approach include 
the forbearance of duplicative proceedings and litigation, a limita-
tion on debtor and creditor forum-shopping, and lower administrative 
costS.144 The disadvantage most often charged against the universality 
approach is that certain creditors who would have benefited from local 
priority or preference schemes in their home countries under a terri-
torial system are disadvantaged. 145 These creditors may suffer hardship 
that could be exacerbated by the need to travel abroad to realize 
dividends on their claims.146 In fact, the increased cost of pursuing 
litigation abroad may deter smaller claim-holders from pursuing their 
rights altogether. 147 This could be the result notwithstanding voluntary 
agreements to the contrary, for example, through forum-selection 
clauses incorporated into international contracts. 148 
The case most often cited as the essence of the universality approach 
is In re Maxwell Communications Corp., discussed earlier. I49 The In re 
Maxwell case involved the dissolution of billionaire Robert Maxwell's 
international publishing empire. 150 With its principal seat of business 
located in London, England, but most of its assets distributed through-
out the United States, the administration of the debtor's affairs re-
140 See id. 
141 See id. 
142 See Booth, supra note 2, at 4; Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 481. 
143 See Booth, supra note 2, at 5; Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 481. 
144 See Booth, supra note 2, at 5; Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 481; Kraft & Aranson, 
supra note 94, at 336. 
145 See Booth, supra note 2, at 5; Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 481; Kraft & Aranson, 
supra note 94, at 336. 
146 See Booth, supra note 2, at 5; Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 481; Kraft & Aranson, 
supra note 94, at 336. 
147 Although one could argue that this increased cost is a risk inherent in international trade 
transactions, and that a creditor should not engage in international transactions unless it is able 
and willing to pursue its rights in a foreign jurisdiction, sllch a position may generate an unequal 
playing field that favors large international entities to the exclusion of smaller enterprises. 
148 See Raslllllssen, supra note 75, at 5. 
149 See In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), afJ'd 186 
B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
150 See In re Maxwell Communications C01P., 186 B.R. at 813-14. 
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suited in the filing of two bankruptcy proceedings, an administration 
proceeding in the V.K. and a chapter 11 proceeding in the V.S.151 The 
V.S. bankruptcy judge, in one of the first instances of significant' 
judicial cooperation, appointed a V.S. examiner with the explicit in-
structions to cooperate with the V.K. administrators. 152 The joint ad-
ministration of the estate resulted in what was "perhaps the first world-
wide plan of orderly liquidation ever achieved. "153 As described by V.S. 
bankruptcy Judge Tina Brozman: 
the joint [V.K] administrators, with the concurrence of the 
[V.S.] examiner, filed their plan of reorganization ... and 
scheme of arrangement. Although separate plan and scheme 
documents exist, the plan and scheme are mutually depend-
ent and, in their effect, constitute a single mechanism, con-
sistent with the laws of both countries, for reorganizing [Max-
well Communications Corporation] through the sale of a 
assets as going concerns and for distributing assets to credi-
tors .... Rather than carving up the assets for distribution 
by the two courts to different groups of creditors, the plan 
and scheme set up a single "pot" for distribution to all credi-
tors. In keeping with the single distribution mechanism, cred-
itors were permitted to submit a claim in either jurisdiction 
which would suffice for participation under both the plan and 
the scheme.154 
Although a universality approach is arguably the ideal, application 
of the universality doctrine has been inconsistent and unpredictable. 155 
The doctrine appears most successful in application between two States 
sharing similar legal systems and economic policies, as for example, 
the Vnited States and the Vnited Kingdom. But even between States 
as closely linked as the V.S. and Canada, or the V.S. and Australia, 
application of the universality doctrine is inconsistent.156 And as the 
151 See id. 
152 See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2535. 
153Id. 
154 In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 170 B.R. at 803. 
155 See generally Booth, supra note 2; Burman, supra note 94. 
156See, e.g., In re Toga Manufacturing, 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); In re Interpool, 
102 B.R. 373 (Bankr. D. NJ. 1988). 
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similarities between the States lessen, the application of the doctrine 
likewise weakens. 157 
III. THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW 
A. Origin, Mandate and Composition 
The United Nations General Assembly established the U.N. Commis-
sion on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 1966.158 The General 
Assembly created UNCITRAL in response to the growth of interna-
tional trade and the obstacles with which it was besieged, in particular, 
the divergencies arising from the laws of differen t States relating to 
trade matters. 159 Although the U.N. recognized efforts made by inter-
governmental and non-governmental organizations towards progres~ 
sive harmonization and unification of international trade law, the Gen-
eral Assembly noted that progress in the area was not commensurate 
with the importance and urgency of the problem. 160 Based on its belief 
that the process of harmonization and unification of in ternational 
157 See, e.g., Petition of Hourani, 180 B.R. 58 (Bankr. S.D.N.V 1995) Oordanian insolvency 
proceeding); In re Lineas Areas de Nicaragua. 180 B.R. 58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Nicaraguan 
insolvency proceeding). 
158 See International Trade Law Information on UNCITRAL (visited Apr. 17, 1999) <http:/ / 
ananse.irv.uit.no/trade_law/papers/UNCITRAL.html#NRl > [hereinafter ITL Information]; 
Memorandum to the International Bar Association Committee on UNCITRAL/INSOL Collo-
quium, Apr. 17, 1994 - Apr. 19, 1994, Vienna (May, 1994) (unpublished memorandum on file 
with Daniel M. Glosband at Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, LLP, Boston, Mass.) [hereinafter Glosband 
Memo I]; see also Daniel Glosband, UNCITRAL's New Model Cross-border Insolvency Law Explained, 
30-22 Bankl'. Ct. Dec. (CCR) A7-A8 Ouly, 1997). 
159G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc A/6594 reprinted in [1966) U.N.Y.B. 
917,917-21, U.N. Doc. A/6396/Corr. 1,2/1966 (establishing UNCITRAL) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 
2205). 
160 See id. The Secretary-General's report on international trade law defined the expression "law 
of international trade" as "the body of ruies governing commercial relationships of a private law 
nature involving different countries." Id. Topics falling within the scope of the law of international 
trade include the international sale of goods, the formation of contracts, agency arrangements, 
exclusive sale arrangements, insurance, transportation, calTiage of goods by sea or air, commer-
cial arbitration, and industrial property and copyright. See id. The scope of international trade 
law does not extend to international commercial relations on the level of public law, such as 
transactions involving the attitude and behavior of States when regulating the conduct of trade 
affecting their territories, in the exercise of their sovereign powers (e.g., the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") or TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 
1992, OJ. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY]). See id. 
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trade law should be substantially coordinated, systematized and accel-
erated, and that the United Nations should playa more active role in 
reducing and removing legal obstacles to the flow of international 
trade, the General Assembly established UNCITRAL as the vehicle 
through which it could meet its perceived obligations. ](i1 
UNCITRAL's mission is the promotion of the progressive harmoni-
zation and unification of the law of international trade. 162 Since its 
inception, the Commission has become the core legal body of the U.N. 
system in the field of international trade law. 163 It is composed of 
thirty-six member States elected by the General Assembly.164 Member-
ship is designed to be representative of the world's diverse geographic 
regions and its principal economic and legal systems.165 
B. UNCITRAL Sessions and Working Groups 
The Commission carries out its work at annual sessions at which 
member and non-member States as well as interested international 
organizations are invited to attend. 166 UNCITRAL has established three 
working groups to perform the substantive preparatory work on topics 
within its work program. 167 Areas in which the Commission has worked 
or is working include: the international sale of goods and related 
matters,168 the international transport of goods,169 international com-
161 See UNCITRAL 26th Sess., supra note 11. 
162 G.A. Res. 2205, supra note 159. 
163 See ITL Information, supra note 158. 
164 See id. 
165 Members of the Commission are elected for terms of six years, with terms of half the 
members expiring every three years. See id. 
166The annual sessions are held in alternate years at the U.N. Headquarters in New York and 
at the Vienna International Centre at Vienna. Non-member States and international organiza-
tions attend sessions as observers. Observers are permitted to participate in discussions at sessions 
of the Commission and its working groups to the same extent as members. See ITL Information, 
supra note 158. 
167 See id. (each of the working groups is composed of all member States of the Commission). 
168 See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Int'l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Convention on the Limitation Period 
in the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 63/15, 1974 U.NJ,Y.B. 92 (1974); U.N. 
Comm. on Int'l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF 97/18,19 I.L.M. 671 (1980); U.N. Comm. on Int'I Trade Law, UNCITRAL 
Legal Guide on International Countertrade Transactions, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.B/31, U.N. Sales 
No. E.93.V.7 (1993). 
169 See, e.g., U.N. Conun. on Int'l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Convention on the Carriage of Goods 
IJy Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 89/5,1978 U.NJ,Y.B. 122,17 I.L.M. 608 (1978). 
1999) CRoss-BoRDER INSOLVENCY 405 
mercial arbitration and conciliation,170 public procurement,171 interna-
tional payments,I72 and electronic commerce. 173 
C. Creation of the UNCITRAL Working Group on Insolvency Law and 
the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
In 1992, UNCITRAL held a Congress under the theme "Uniform 
Commercial Law in the Twenty-first Century."174 An urgent topic at the 
1992 Congress was the unpredictability and disharmony arising from 
international insolvencies, and the international community's lack of 
a coherent legal framework through which to manage the failure of 
multinational corporations. 175 In 1993, the Commission requested an 
in-depth study on the desirability and feasibility of uniform rules for 
transnational insolvencies. 176 Prior to the decision to undertake work 
on transnational insolvency, UNCITRAL and the International Asso-
ciation of Insolvency Practitioners (INSOL) held a Colloquium on 
Cross-Border Insolvency at Vienna in April, 1994.177 
One of the suggestions arising from the Colloquium was that work 
by UNCITRAL should initially be limited to the goals of facilitating 
judicial cooperation, court access for foreign insolvency administrators 
and recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings.178 Following these 
suggestions, an international meeting of judges was held to elicit their 
views on the specific subject. 179 The participating judges and govern-
170 See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Int'I Trade Law, UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceed-
ings, I.S.B.N. 92-133542-8, U.N. Sales No. E.97.V.ll (1996); U.N. Comm. on Int'I Trade Law, 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, I.S.B.N. 92-1-133498-5, U.N. 
Sales No. E.95.V.18 (1994). 
171 See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Int'I Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, 
Construction and Services, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SERA, U.N. Sales No. E.95.V.20 (1995). 
172 See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Int'l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Convention on International Bills of 
Exchange and International Promissory Notes, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/386 (1993); U.N. Comm. on Int'l 
Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/384 
(1993); U.N. Comm. on Int'l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Convention on Independent Guarantees and 
Stand-by Letters of Credit, I.S.B.N. 97-1-133525-6, U.N. Sales No. E.97.V.12 (1995). 
173 See, e.g., Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: Model Law on Electronic Commerce Adopted 
by the U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, G.A. Res 51/162, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/51/162 (1997). 
174 See UNCITRAL 30th Sess., supra note 8, at 5, 11 12. 
175 See id. 
176 See id. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
179 See UNCITRAL 30th Sess., supra note 8, at 5, 1 12. 
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ment officials agreed that it would be worthwhile for UNCITRAL to 
. provide a legislative framework through which to meet these goals. 180 
In May, 1995, at its twenty-eighth session, UNCITRAL committed 
itself to the task of preparing uniform provisions on judicial coopera-
tion in cross-border insolvencies, court access for foreign insolvency 
administrators and recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings.181 
The project was entrusted to one of UNCITRAL's intergovernmental 
working groups predictably named the Working Group on Insolvency 
Law. 182 The Working Group devoted four two-week sessions to work on 
the project from which the UNCITRAL Model Provisions on Cross-Bor-
der Insolvency arose.183 The Commission adopted the Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency on May 30, 1997, after spending most of its 
Commission meeting debating and refining the draft produced by the 
Working Group. 184 
III. IN FAVOR OF A UNIVERSAL SOLUTION: THE UNCITRAL MODEL 
LAw ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 
A. Development oj the Act 
The Final Draft of the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (the 
"Model Law") was officially adopted after four two-week Working 
Group meetings between October 1995 andJanuary 1997, and a three 
week meeting of the full United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law. 185 Adoption of the Model Law at the May, 1997 Commission 
meeting was anything but certain.186 Last minute negotiations at the 
January, 1997 Working Group meeting revolving around several key 
180 See id. 
181 See id. at 5, , 13. 
182 See id. 
183 See id. (The sessions were held (1) fwm October 30 - November 10, 1995, in Vienna; (2) 
from April 1 - 12, 1996, in New York; (3) fwm October 7 - 18, 1996, in Vienna; and (4) fwm 
January 20 - 31, 1997, in New York. The full Commission meeting at which the Model Law was 
adopted was held fwm May 12 - 30,1997, in Vienna.). 
184 See UNCITRAL 30th Sess., supra note 8, at 5, 1 16. 
185 See Memorandum for Committee J Meeting, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency (as adopted on May 30, 1997) (November 4, 1997) (unpublished memorandum, 
International Bar Ass'n) (on file with Daniel M. Glosband, Goodwin, Pwcter & Hoar, LLP, Boston, 
Mass.) [hereinafter Glosband Memo Ill. Mr. Glosband was the representative of the Insolvency 
and Creditors Rights Committee of the International Bar Association to the four sessions of the 
Working Gwup on Insolvency Law of UNCITRAL. 
186 See id. 
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components almost resulted in arrested progress and failure. ls7 Never-
theless, at the full commission meeting in May, over forty attendant 
countries adopted the Model Law as drafted. ISS 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency is primarily 
the result of private initiative, strongly supported by judges, judicial 
administrators and government officials. 189 The UNCITRAL venture 
was a response to the observation that the old methods of dealing with 
cross border insolvency were insufficien t to address the needs of parties 
and courts when faced with the difficulties of rescuing a corporate 
enterprise operating simultaneously in two or more States. 190 In the 
hopes of achieving flexibility in application and expedition in enact-
ment, the Commission opted to prepare model legislation in lieu of 
a model treaty. 191 The Commission promoted model legislation and 
reserved consideration of model treaty provisions on judicial coopera-
tion in cross-border insolvency for a later date because treaty negotia-
tions and ratification are often more involved than individual enact-
ment of legislation directed towards unifying an area of international 
law. 192 
When an insolvency proceeding involves more than one country, the 
Model Law should produce essentially the following salutary results: 
creditors, regardless of country, will receive equal, non-discriminatory 
treatment; courts and representatives of insolvency estates will commu-
nicate and cooperate with each other to coordinate the administration 
of such estates and the conduct of concurrent proceedings involving 
a common debtor; and persons or bodies authorized to administer 
reorganizations or liquidations will have expeditious access to foreign 
courts and to the relief they need to protect the assets of the debtor 
or the interests of the creditors.19~ 
The Model Law seeks to accomplish its goals through a legal regime 
that reconciles three related concepts: recognition of a foreign insol-
vency proceeding by a State that has enacted the Model Law (referred 
187 See id. 
188 See id. Completion of the drafting in the six U.N. languages, debate over one remnant article 
and completion of the official report occupied the final week of the three-week Commission 
meeting. See id. 
189 See UNCITRAL 30th Sess., supra note S, at 6, " IS, 19. 
190 See id. at 6, , 22. 
191 See id. at 7, , 26. 
192 See id. 
19:~Glosband Memo II, supra note IS5, at 1. "[Hlistorically, most countries have locked their 
doors against entry by foreign insolvency proceedings." Id. 
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to as an "Enacting State"); access to judicial proceedings in the Enact-
ing State by duly appointed foreign representatives; and the availability 
of specified relief upon recognition. 194 The available relief is based on 
protecting the debtor's and creditors' interests in an orderly admini-
stration of the bankruptcy estate, including the assets situated in the 
Enacting State. 195 The scope of relief varies and attempts to promote 
fairness for both local and foreign creditors in the claims adjudication 
process. l96 As the Model Law is enacted by various States, its procedural 
mechanisms and forms of relief would become incorporated into the 
domestic law of the Enacting States, thereby increasing overall har-
monization of cross-border insolvency law and practice generally.197 
B. Provisions of the Act 
l. Policy and Scope 
As stated in the Preamble, the purpose of the Model Law is to 
provide "effective mechanisms" for dealing with cross-border insol-
vency cases. 198 This focus on procedural means through which to pro-
mote its objectives, rather than changes to substantive bankruptcy law, 
reflects the Model Law's private practitioner roots.I\)9 International 
business is ultimately more concerned with predictable outcomes and 
stability than with "the best" substantive bankruptcy law. 20o The Pream-
ble continues to detail the specific objectives it seeks to achieve: 
cooperation between the courts and other competent auth-
orities of the [Enacting] State and foreign States; 
greater legal certainty for trade and investment; 
fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies 
that protects the interests of all creditors and other interested 
persons, including the debtor; 
protection and maximization of the value of the debtor's 
assets; and 
194 See Gaa & Garzon, supra note 9, at 274. 
195 See id. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. 
198 Report of the United Nations Comm. on Int'l Trade Law on the Work of its Thirtieth Session, 
U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Stipp. No. 17, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (1998) (hereinafter 
Model Law]. 
199 See Gaa & Garzon, supra note 9, at 273. 
200 See e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 75, at 19-20. 
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facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, 
thereby protecting investment and preserving employment.201 
409 
The stated order of objectives is not determinative of actual priority, 
although to some degree it reflects the source of the Model Law: 
private practitioners, lenders, judges and judicial administrators. 202 Fa-
cilitatingjudicial cooperation and providing improved court access for 
foreign insolvency administrators are the two suggested goals derived 
from the March, 1995 Judicial Colloquium on Cross-Border Insolvency 
that initially inspired the UNCITRAL Model Law project.203 Given 
UNCITRAL's private international law mission, promoting legal cer-
tainty for trade and investment is consistent with the Commission's 
fundamental goals and addresses the primary complaint by interna-
tional lenders and businessmen.204 The fair and efficient administra-
tion of cross-border insolvencies,205 the protection and maximization 
of the debtor's assets, and the potential reorganization of the debtor's 
business,206 naturally and to some extent inevitably, follow from these 
first two objectives.207 
The Model Law lays the foundation for a universality-based legal 
regime but retains key territoriality provisions. 20R Thus, the Model Law 
strives for cooperation between States in order to maximize harmoni-
zation between concurrent proceedings.209 To this extent it generates 
a universality-oriented system. However, the Model Law does not create 
a regime in which one insolvency proceeding necessarily dominates. 210 
Instead, the Model Law anticipates concurrent proceedings which it 
attempts to coordinate.21l Local parties in interest always retain the 
option of retreating to the familiar territory of a local proceeding.212 
201 Model Law, supra note 198, Preamble. 
202 See UNCITRAL 30th Sess., supra note 8, at 5-6, n 12, 17. 
203 See id. at 5, 'l[ 12. 
204 See Dunne, supra note 9, at 99 (criticizing lack of certainty): Rasmussen, supra note 75, at 
20-21. 
205 See Model Law, supra note 198. The Model Law defines this, in part, by the protection of 
the interests of all creditors and the debtor. See id. 
206 The inclusion of reorganization as a legitimate objective is actually remarkable, because 
many countries traditionally rocus on liquidation. See Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 2 
("The nod to rescues which enhance investment and employment signals a nascent awareness by 
many countries that their traditional focus on liquidation may be anachronistic."). 
207 See Model Law, supra note 198, Preamble, §§ (c)-(e). 
208 See Glosband, supra note 158, at A7. 
209 See id. at A 7. 
210 See id. 
211 See id. 
212 See id. at A9. 
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This deference to local proceedings was a political necessity and ac-
commodates concerns about potentially over-intrusive foreign pro-
ceedings dominating local insolvency systems.213 
The Model Law balances universality goals against the needs of 
territoriality based regimes. A representative of a foreign insolvency 
proceeding can seek recognition and assistance in any State that enacts 
the Model Law,214 concurrent proceedings regarding the same debtor 
may be coordinated through provisions in the Model Law,215 and inter-
ested parties (including creditors) have a means to participate in a 
domestic proceeding.216 Enacting States may, however, choose to ex-
clude certain insolvency proceedings involving special kinds of debtors, 
such as domestically regulated banks or insurance companies.217 Any 
conflicting treaty will supersede the Model Law,218 and courts retain the 
power to refuse action under the Model Law if it should be manifestly 
contrary to the public policy of the Enacting State.219 
2. Effects of and Relief Under the Model Law 
Perhaps the most remarkable provision of the Model Law is its 
automatic creation of a limited stay upon recognition of a foreign 
insolvency proceeding in an Enacting State.220 Recognition of a foreign 
main proceeding enjoins (1) the commencement or continuation of 
individual actions or individual proceedings concerning the debtor's 
assets, rights, obligations or liabilities;221 (2) execution against the debt-
213 See id; see also, e.g., Model Law, supra note 198, art. 21 (2) (allowing court to entrust the 
distribution of all or part of the debtor's assets located in the Enacting State to the foreign 
representative, "provided that the court is satisfied that the interests of [local creditors] are 
adequately protected"); art. 6 (allowing the court to refuse to take action under the Model Law 
if contrary to the public policy of the State); art. 20(4) (no automatic stay of commencement on 
local bankruptcy proceedings). If for example, a foreign proceeding has been recognized or· an 
application for recognition has been filed and a subsequent local proceeding is commenced, any 
relief by the local court must be reviewed and will be modified if it is inconsistent with the local 
proceeding. See Glosband, supra note 158, at A7-A9. 
214 Model Law, supra note 198, art. 1, §§ (a)-(b). 
215 [d. § (c). 
216 See Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 2-3; Gaa & Garzon, supra note 9, at 274-75. 
217 See Model Law, supra note 191, art 1, § 2; Glosband Memo, supra note 178, at 3. 
21BModei Law, supra note 198, art. 3. 
219 [d. art. 6. ("Nothing in this Law prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed 
by this Law if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of this State."). 
220 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 20, § (l); Gaa & Garzon, supra note 9, at 277; Glosband, 
supra note 158, at A7. 
221 Model Law, supra note 198, art. 20, § (l)(a). 
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or's assets;222 and (3) a debtor's right to transfer, encumber or other-
wise dispose of any assets. 223 The stay does not bar the commencement 
of local insolvency proceedings, or the commencement or continu-
ation of actions to the limited extent necessary to preserve claims 
under local law. 224 In addition, the scope of the stay and its modification 
and termination are subject to any exceptions, limitations, modifica-
tions or termination that exist in the Enacting State's existing insol-
vency laws.22:; The effect of incorporating such exceptions is that enact-
ing the Model Law will not require substantial modification of existing 
law because the established exceptions and conditions in domestic law 
are imported directly into the Model Law when enacted.226 
In addition to the automatic stay upon recognition of a foreign main 
proceeding, a foreign bankruptcy administrator may request emer-
gency relief pending recognition of the main proceeding.227 Such relief 
is at the court's discretion, and must be "urgently needed" to protect 
the assets of the debtor or interests of creditors. 22R Relief may include 
a stay of execution against the debtor's assets, administration or reali-
zation of perishable or devaluing assets to the foreign administrator, 
and a potential freeze on assets.229 Broad, non-emergency relief is also 
available at the court's discretion, on recognition of a foreign main 
proceeding, and includes remedies ranging from stays of specific ac-
tions and asset disposition to discovery and turnover of assets to the 
foreign representative. 230 
All forms of relief are subject to conditions imposed by the court.231 
Generally, relief must protect the debtor's assets or the interests of 
222Id. at § (1)(b). 
223 See id. at § (1) (c). 
224 See id. at § (2). 
225 See id. art. 20, § (2)-(4); Glosband & Katucki, supra note 9, at 6-7. 
226 See Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 6-7. Thus, for example, exceptions for police 
power enforcement, alimony and support available under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code would be 
imported directly into the provisions ofthe Model Code. See id. The "import" provision also works 
in tandem with another provision to penn it modification or termination of the stay, or of 
recognition in those States that treat recognition and its effects as a unitary judgment not 
susceptible to alteration other than by appeal or for mistake. See id. In some States, recognition 
creates a separate status with predetermined effects. See id. In those States, effects are not viewed 
as orders which can be modified. It is for this reason that the Model Law does not reference the 
article creating the stay effects (article 20) to the article dealing with modification or termination 
of relief (art. 22). See id. 
227 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 19; Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 7. 
228 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 19. 
229 See id. 
230 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 21; Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 7. 
231 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 21; Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 7. 
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creditors.232 The court may modiry or terminate relief on its own initia-
tive, or at the request of a foreign representative or a person affected 
by the relief.233 A foreign representative, upon recognition of the for-
eign insolvency proceeding, may also have standing to bring avoidance 
actions of the type available under the Enacting State's insolvency 
law.234 A final relief provision that stops short of substituting the foreign 
representative for the debtor, nevertheless allows a foreign repre-
sentative to intervene in judicial proceedings as a third party in a 
proceeding in which the debtor has an interest.235 
3. Recognition of Foreign Insolvency Proceedings and Foreign 
Access to Domestic Courts 
The Model Law distinguishes between "foreign main" and "foreign 
non-main" insolvency proceedings, a distinction that affects the type 
of available relief and reflects its underlying vision.236 The Model Law 
does not strive to create a pure universality regime in which one set of 
substantive law applies to all cross-border insolvencies, and wherein 
one administrator collects and distributes all of the debtor's assets.237 
Rather, the Model Law seeks to facilitate the operation of existing State 
laws by removing procedural barriers to judicial cooperation, increas-
ing a court's authority to grant relief to foreign representatives, and 
creating a global quiet time in which bankruptcy administrators can 
organize the debtors affairs.238 The Model Law seeks to address the 
realities of existing cross-border insolvency law. It is designed to pre-
vent the common situation wherein a multi-national corporation files 
bankruptcy in State A, a filing that inevitably unleashes a mad scramble 
to the courthouse stairs in multiple jurisdictions throughout the world, 
and which results in the piecemeal dismemberment of the debtor's 
232 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 22, § (1). 
233 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 22, §§ (2), (3). 
234 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 23. This article apparen tly was added over the strong 
objection of the United State delegation. See Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 7-8. As 
drafted, the article does not addl'ess choice of law issues, nor does it create any substantive rights. 
See id. A U.S. objection rested primarily on the unresolved policy and choice of law problems 
which the article introduced. See id. The article's inclusion, however, was strongly supported by 
most of the other delegates who believed the type of relief was essential. See id. 
235 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 24. The foreign representative must meet tlle require-
ments of the Enacting State applicable to third party intervention proceedings. See id. 
236 See Model Law, supra note 198, alt. 2. 
237 See id. 
238 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 2; see generally Glosband Memo II, supra note 185. 
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affairs. Under the Model Law, the bankruptcy filing in State A empow-
ers State A's bankruptcy administrator ("foreign representative" in 
Model Law parlance)239 to stay actions in another State and to seek 
additional relief from such States to facilitate the fair and efficient 
administration of the debtor's estate.240 
Under the Model Law, therefore, a foreign representative may apply 
directly to the appropriate court (the "Recognizing Court") in the 
Enacting State for recognition of the foreign proceeding.241 This abro-
gates the need for formal recognition procedures currently de rigueur 
in most States, including application for recognition through diplo-
matic or consular channels (e.g., exequatur actions) .242 The foreign 
representative is entitled to go to court in the same manner that any 
local party in interest might, while retaining the additional benefit of 
not subjecting himself to personal jurisdiction beyond the scope of the 
insolvency proceeding.243 "In most countries, such open access is quite 
simply revolutionary."244 In addition to the right to appear directly in 
the court of an Enacting State, a foreign representative has the con-
comitant right to initiate a local insolvency proceeding if all conditions 
other than standing are otherwise met. 24:; 
Of equal novelty is the Model Law's provision granting foreign 
creditors the same rights as local creditors to participate in insolvency 
proceedings.246 Local laws will continue to govern the rank or priority 
of claims, with the caveat that a foreign claim cannot be ranked lower 
than a general unsecured claim unless an equivalent local claim would 
also be downgraded.247 To ensure that the foreign creditors' have a 
meaningful right to participate in local proceedings, the Model Law 
mandates that all notices given to local creditors must also be given to 
foreign creditors. 248 Individual notice, not notice by publication in a 
239 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. I ("definitions"). 
240 See id., Preamble. 
241 See Gaa & Garzon, supra note 9, at 275; Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 5. 
242 See Gaa & Garzon, supra note 9, at 275; Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 5. 
243 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 9 ("Right of Direct Access"); art. 10 ("Limited Jurisdic-
tion"). 
244 Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 5. 
245 See Model Law, supra note 198, Chapter 5 ("Concurrent Proceedings"). 
246 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 13. 
247 See id.; Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 3. A footnote to article 13 provides an alternate 
option to countries who wish to exclude foreign tax or social security claims, a practice which 
many countries presently follow and would probably insist on maintaining. See Glosband Memo 
II, supra note 185, at 3. 
248 See Model Law, supra note 191, art. 14; Glosband Memo, supra note 185, at 3. 
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journal or posted in court, is required.249 Furthermore, if the notice 
advises creditors of the commencement of the insolvency proceedings, 
the notice must indicate a reasonable time for filing claims, specify the 
place of filing, indicate whether secured creditors must file claims at 
all, and provide any other information ordinarily given to local credi-
tors.250 
For a foreign representative to avail himself of many of the Model 
Law's powers, the proceeding in which he was appointed must be 
"recognized" by the court of the Enacting State.251 To be "recognized," 
the foreign proceeding must be "a collective judicial or administrative 
proceeding in a foreign state, pursuant to a law relating to insolvency, 
in which proceeding the debtor's assets and affairs are subject to the 
control or supervision by a foreign court for the purpose of reorgani-
zation or liquidation. "252 This definition excludes actions by individual 
creditors, such as a receivership.253 Recognizing administrative as well 
as judicial proceedings acknowledges the extra-judicial approach that 
some countries adopt for insolvencies. 254 The reference to "a law relat-
ing to insolvency" recognizes that many countries, unlike the United 
States, require a formal determination of economic insolvency prior 
to the initiation of a full bankruptcy proceeding.255 Similarly, the ex-
press inclusion of "interim" proceedings and representatives accommo-
dates British Commonwealth countries in which some proceedings 
pass through a provisional stage prior to becoming permanent or 
complete.256 
As noted, the Model Law distinguishes between "main" and "non-
main" foreign proceedings.257 The distinction reflects the underlying 
goal of resolving cross-border insolvency by establishing one primary 
proceeding that is accompanied by various secondary, or ancillary, 
proceedings in other jurisdictions. Thus, a foreign proceeding is a 
"foreign main proceeding" if it takes place in the "centre of the debt-
or's main interests. "258 Following logically, a foreign representative's 
249 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 14; Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 3-4. 
250 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 14; Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 3. 
251 See Gaa & Garzon, supra note 9, at 275; Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 4. 
252 Model Law, supra note 198, art. 2, § (a). 
253 See id.; Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 4. 
254 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 2, § (a); Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 4. 
255 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 2, § (a); Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 4. 
256 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 2, § (a); Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 4. 
257 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 2. 
258Id. art. 2(c). 
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powers are greater in an Enacting State if he is seeking relief in favor 
ofa main proceeding rather than in favor ofa non-main proceeding.259 
A foreign non-main proceeding is defined essentially as any proceed-
ing "other than a foreign main proceeding," with the condition that 
the debtor must have an "establishment," i.e., more than solely assets, 
involved in such a proceeding.260 
Recognition of a foreign proceeding is not automatic under the 
Model Law.261 The foreign representative must file a petition in the 
Enacting State that documents the commencement of a foreign pro-
ceeding and the representative's proper appointment by the foreign 
court. 262 A foreign representative's application is assisted by a presump-
tion of authenticity.263 The factual determination of where the debtor's 
main interests are located is likewise assisted by a presumption that the 
debtor's "habitual residence" or "registered office" constitutes its main 
location.264 Recognition ofa foreign main proceeding is also proof that 
the debtor is insolvent under the Enacting State's insolvency law, ab-
sent evidence to the contrary.265 
4. Judicial Cooperation and Coordination of Multiple Proceedings 
The final major component of the Model Law is its provision for 
mandatory judicial cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases.26B In 
matters within the scope of the Model Law, courts and estate repre-
sentatives in the Enacting State must "cooperate to the maximum 
extent possible" with foreign courts and foreign representatives.267 And 
just to make matters clear, and in some jurisdictions to allow expansion 
259 Compare Model Law, supra note 198, art. 20 ("Effects of recognition of a foreign main 
proceeding") with art. 21 ("Relief that may be granted upon recognition of a foreign proceed-
ing"). 
260 [d. art. 2, § (c) ("Foreign non-main proceeding"); art. 2, § (f) (establishment). 
261 See Gaa & Garzon, supra note 9, at 275. 
262 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 11; art. 15. 
263 See id. art. 16. 
264 See id. 
265 See id. art. 31. The provision addresses potential variance in what constitutes insolvency as 
between States. For example, a debtor may be insolvent under the laws of State A but not under 
the laws of State B, thereby leaving the liquidator of State A without remedy in State BundeI' 
State B's insolvency laws. Under the Model Law, the very fact that an insolvency proceeding was 
initiated in State A against the debtor establishes that the debtor is insolvent under the bankruptcy 
law of State B, thereby empowering State A's liquidator under State B's insolvency law. 
266 See Model Law, supra note 198, Chapter 4 ("Cooperation with Foreign Courts and Foreign 
Representatives"); Gaa & Garzon, supra note 9, at 281; Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 4. 
267 Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 4. 
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of a court's authority beyond its immediate territory, the Model Law 
entitles courts to "communicate directly with, or to request informa-
tion or assistance directly from, foreign courts or foreign represent-
atives."268 The court can implement such cooperation by "any appro-
priate means" including, e.g., the appointment of persons to act at the 
direction of the court, coordination of administration and supervision 
of the debtor's assets and affairs, use of coordination agreements or 
protocols, and the coordination of concurrent proceedings.269 
The Model Law also promotes the coordination of concurrent pro-
ceedings.27o Consensus exists that multiple proceedings in a cross-bor-
der insolvency case should be minimized, and the Model Law attempts 
to limit the inefficiency of duplicative filings. 271 Two sets of coordina-
tion provisions exist. The first deals with coordination between a local 
proceeding and a foreign proceeding. The second addresses the coor-
dination of more than one foreign proceeding.272 In the first instance, 
if a local proceeding is already taking place and an application for 
recognition is filed by a foreign representative in the same jurisdiction, 
then any relief the court grants must be consistent with the local 
proceeding.273 
In this scenario, the automatic effects of recognition, such as the stay 
of actions and execution, do not apply. 274 Similarly, if an Enacting State 
268 Model Law, supra note 198, art. 25 (I). The extent to which an interested party may compel 
a court to so cooperate or communicate is, however, not as clear. 
269 See Model Law, supra note 191, art. 27 ("Forms of cooperation"); Glosband Memo II, supra 
note 185, at 4. The examiner appointed by the U.S. Bankruptcy judge in In re Maxwell is an 
example of the type of cooperation envisioned under the Model Law. 
270 See Model Law, supra note 198, Ch. 5. 
271 See Gaa & Garzon, supra note 9, at 282-83; Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 8. 
272 See Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 8-9. ("As the january 1997 Working Group Session 
.. approached its conclusion, it became apparent that the relationship among concurrent 
proceedings had to be addressed clearly in the Model Law. For example, what would be the effect 
of a commencement of a local proceeding on the stays imposed by prior recognition of a foreign 
main proceeding? If a local proceeding were already pending, could a foreign proceeding be 
recognized? If so, what effects would it have and what relief could be granted? To address these 
issues, a small group of delegates met on the Saturday following the first week of the january 
session and drafted a set of Principles to be taken into account in the formulation of provisions 
on concurrent proceedings. There was barely time at the end of the january session to begin 
discussion of the Principles and no time to draft the necessary Legislative provisions. Conse-
quently, this critical unfinished topic jeopardized the prospects for adoption of the Model Law 
at the May, 1997 Commission meeting. Delegate initiative again rode to the rescue, with a group 
meeting in Vienna over the weekend prior to the Commission meeting to draft provisions 
consistent with the Principles."). 
273 See Model Law, supra note 191, an. 9, § (a); Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 9. 
274 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 9, § (a); Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 9. 
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has recognized a foreign proceeding, and then a local proceeding is 
commenced, the court in the Enacting State must review any relief 
requested by the foreign representative and will modify or terminate 
such relief if it is inconsistent with the local proceeding.275 
The Model Law therefore defers to local proceedings, notwithstand-
ing its universality outlook. This homage to local proceedings is politi-
cally motivated and reflects the need to offer an escape from the 
potentially significant intrusion of a foreign proceeding into an Enact-
ing State's domestic legallandscape.27G 
The availability of local proceedings offers potential sanctuary from 
the feared predations of the newly admitted foreign representative. 277 
If access, recognition and relief prove too terrifying to a local party in 
interest, it can always retreat to the familiar territory of a local pro-
ceeding coupled with the mandate to the local court and local admin-
istrator to cooperate with the foreign court and foreign representative 
plus the statement of the universal purpose of the Model Law.278 
In general, the coordination of multiple foreign proceedings seek-
ing recognition in an Enacting State basically aims to recognize the 
primacy of a foreign main proceeding, if in fact, one exists. 279 
IV. How WELL THE NEEDS ARE MET: ANALYZING THE MODEL LAW 
IN HYPOTHETICAL APPLICATION 
As noted, a cross-border insolvency presents at least four essential, 
unaddressed needs: (1) the need for harmonized effect of insolvency 
proceedings initiated in one State on assets located in another; (2) the 
need to share information and to promote cross-border judicial coop-
eration; (3) the need for creditor participation in insolvency proceed-
ings; and (4) the need to predict which applicable law and which 
choice of forum will govern. 2HO Although the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Cross-Border Insolvency is not the mythical panacea for which one 
might have wished, the Model Law does go a long way towards resolv-
ing many of the outstanding issues. 
275 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 9, § (a); Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 9. 
276 See Model Law, supra note 198, art. 9, § (a); Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 9. 
277 See Glosband Memo II, supra note 185, at 9. 
278 See id. 
279 See id. 
280 See supra Part I. 
418 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXII, No.2 
A. Preamble and General Provisions 
The stated purpose of the Model Law is broad and addresses most 
of the major criticisms lodged against the present state of cross-border 
insolvency chaos.281 Its objectives, however, are not necessarily inde-
pendent. The question arises as to how much priority anyone objective 
should enjoy in actual application. The Preamble's third objective, for 
example, the "fair and efficient administration of cross-border insol-
vencies," appears to be the controlling goal of the Model Law. 282 Its 
placement as one factor on a list of several makes one wonder how a 
court would apply the objective in any given case. Similarly, is judicial 
cooperation a goal in its own right? Or is it coextensive with the other 
objectives, for example, with the goal of greater legal certainty for trade 
and investment? How do the objectives provide guidance in the event 
of conflict? According to what standard of priority should a court weigh 
the Model Law's objectives if greater legal certainty for a business 
means application of local laws to the detriment of foreign creditors, 
e.g., in the event of recognition ofa negotiated forum-selection clause? 
Because the Preamble does not provide substantive relief, prioritiz-
ing the objectives may amount to no more than an intellectual exercise 
in the majority of cases.283 However, when reading the objectives, the 
frustration of the U.S. courts in applying section 304(c) of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code comes to mind.284 This provision of the Code lists 
"comity" as one of several factors a court must consider when deciding 
whether to grant relief to a foreign representative in an ancillary U.S. 
proceeding.285 As suggested by the Honorable Burton R. Lifland, com-
ity is the central theme of section 304, and its placement as but one 
factor on a list of factors usually cited to define the concept blurs the 
necessary centrality of the doctrine. 286 The Model Law, by listing the 
fair and effi ci en t administration of cross-border insolvencies as just one 
objective on a list of several, may similarly cloud its application in 
practice.287 Antithetically, the enumeration of equally compelling ob-
jectives may enable a court to accommodate a variety of cross-border 
281 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
282 See Model Law, supra note 198, Preamble. 
283 See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text. 
284 See II U.S.C. § 304 (1994). 
285 See id. 
286 See Han. Burton R. Lifland, Suggestions for the National Bankruptcy Review Comm'n and 
Congress, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 530, 530 (1996). 
287 See Model Law, supra note 198, Preamble. 
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insolvency needs as they arise on a case-by-case basis. Thus a court may 
justify particular decisions by the most appropriate objective, rather 
than having to contort a singular objective to meet the particulars of 
the case. 
One of the strongest aspects of the Model Law is its straight-forward 
theoretical scheme. The Model Law makes possible a world in which 
there is one primary insolvency proceeding, the success of which is 
enhanced by coordinated global ancillary proceedings.288 Even if con-
current full-fledged local insolvency proceedings exist, the Model Law 
mandates judicial cooperation and harmonizes the proceedings as 
between States.289 This clearly promotes efficiency and is a significant 
improvement over the existing state of affairs in which one State's 
judiciary may not even be aware of concurrent proceedings in a sister 
State. 
Another attractive feature of the Model Law is its neutrality. The 
Model Law does not suggest that one State's substantive law is superior 
to that of another; in fact, the Model Law is equally effective regardless 
of which substantive laws are applied.290 Because the Model Law strives 
for the harmonization of multiple proceedings, ideally but not neces-
sarily with one main proceeding and supportive ancillary proceedings, 
there is no need to favor a particular substantive insolvency regime.291 
In accord with this goal, the Model Law contains broad, non-preferen-
tial definitions that accommodate almost any State's definition of in-
solvency proceeding, administrator, and court. 292 This lack of national 
chauvinism makes the Model Law immediately appealing. 
B. Access of Foreign Creditors 
The ease of court access, by both foreign representatives and foreign 
creditors, is a commendable aspect of the Model Law.293 Given the 
interdependency of the international economy, the speed at which 
information travels, and the extent of international trade, antiquated 
procedures for gaining access to foreign courts clearly impede the 
efficient administration of a cross-border insolvency procedure. Even 
States with generally free access to court systems, such as the United 
288 See supra notes 208-19 and accompanying text. 
289 See supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text. 
290 See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text. 
291 See id. 
292 See id. 
293 See supra notes 241-45 and accompanying text. 
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States, retain notions of personal and in rem jurisdiction whose appli-
cation are arguably no longer appropriate for the modern world.294 
Universal access to all courts with jurisdiction limited to the issues 
of the insolvency proceedings goes a long way towards promoting the 
efficient and fair administration of a debtor's estate. The ignominious 
events surrounding the dissolution of the Herstatt Bank in the late 
seventies, where the foreign administrator was trying to marshal the 
debtor's U.S. assets without setting foot inside the U.S. for fear of 
exposing himself to personal jurisdiction, would thus become a thing 
of the past in all States.295 Even in the event that a race to the court-
house stairs ensues under the Model Law as it typically does without 
the law, at least the bankruptcy administrator will be on equal footing 
with the local creditors, rather than being forced to wade through 
diplomatic channels while the assets of the estate disappear before his 
eyes. 296 In fact, a foreign representative may have advance notice of any 
bankruptcy filing, thereby enabling the representative to herald his 
forces and file before the competing creditors in most jurisdictions. 
C. Recognition of a Foreign Proceeding and Relief 
In granting universal recognition of foreign proceedings, the Model 
Law creates an effective mechanism by which administration of cross-
border insolvencies can become more efficient. The removal of proce-
dural barriers will facilitate the coordination of insolvency proceed-
ings. The Model Law provides relief from the current state of affairs 
where insolvency administrators from one State often cannot file for 
ancillary relief in another State simply because of archaic procedural 
barriers.297 A debtor's assets may therefore be pooled for efficient and 
equitable distribution among creditors. The Model Law also improves 
the prospects that an insolvency proceeding in "the center of the 
debtor's main interests" will be given universal effect in foreign juris-
dictions, thereby minimizing duplicative filings and litigation.298 
The creation of an automatic moratorium on actions against 
the debtor and its assets upon recognition of a foreign main proceed-
ing under the Model Law is also a significant achievement. 299 This 
294 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
295 See supra note 25. 
296 See supra notes 241-45 and accompanying text. 
297 See id. 
298 See supra notes 257-65 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text. 
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moratorium allows the main insolvency administrator the opportunity 
to herald and organize the debtor's estate.300 It prevents piecemeal 
dismemberment of the debtor's assets and encourages cross-border 
communication not only between judges, but between creditors as 
well. 30! As with the stay under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the Model 
Law's moratorium creates an environment that protects creditors from 
each other and that will hopefully encourage more efficient private 
settlements. However, the automatic moratorium under the Model Law 
only arises upon recognition of a foreign main proceeding.302 The 
practical effect of this limitation is that the foreign administrator must 
file for relief in all jurisdictions worldwide in which the debtor has 
assets. The inevitable lag in timing may result in lost assets, although 
the threat is probably insignificant in real world application and better 
than the current situation. In fact, the mandatory effects of the Model 
Law may give the foreign administrator a significant strategic advan-
tage when planning the dissolution or reorganization of the debtor's 
affairs. The foreign administrator, who may in some cases be the 
debtor's existing management, can rely on the effects of the Model 
Law in Enacting States to determine how best to allocate its resources 
on an international level. In contrast to the existing state of affairs in 
which a foreign administrator may not even have access to another 
State's legal system, let alone be able to predict the outcome of a 
particular course of action, under the Model Law, the foreign admin-
istrator can rely on a certain level of consistency in both legal effect 
and access.303 Furthermore, under the Model Law, the foreign admin-
istrator has the power to seek emergency relief pending recognition 
of the foreign main proceeding and as drafted, enjoys the same avoid-
ance powers to undo preferential transfers as an administrator would 
under existing, domestic laws. 304 
D. Mandatory Judicial Cooperation 
Mandatory communication between courts involved in cross-border 
insolvencies also enhances the efficient administration of a debtor's 
estate.305 If domestic courts can rely on foreign courts for information 
300 See id. 
301 See id. 
302 See id. 
303 See supra notes 23-25, 220-26 and accompanying text. 
304 See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
305 See supra notes 30-39, 266-69 and accompanying text. 
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and cooperation, duplicative proceedings and unnecessary litigation 
may be reduced. Judicial cooperation also infuses the entire cross-bor-
der insolvency process with new stability because debtors and creditors 
no longer have to divine individual judicial reactions to foreign pro-
ceedings. The Model Law's mandatory cooperation may frustrate those 
parties who rely on the existing state of miscommunication as a strate-
gic device. The mandatory cooperation may also surprise small, local 
creditors who may not be aware that the debtor with whom they are 
dealing is a multi-national entity. However, in most circumstances, 
enhanced judicial cooperation will greatly increase the likelihood of 
equitable treatment of all parties. 
As currently drafted, insolvency judges enjoy a fair amount of discre-
tion and autonomy under the Model Law. The judiciary's potentially 
dominant position in cross-border insolvencies raises interesting ques-
tions regarding the appropriate role of judges in managing interna-
tional business affairs. The appropriateness of that result, however, is 
beyond the scope of this Note. Undoubtedly, the interaction of the 
various judicial systems and insolvency regimes under the Model Law 
will provide fertile ground for the generation of novel approaches to 
the management of transnational corporations in general. 
CONCLUSION 
The existing state of cross-border insolvency law is one of undiffer-
entiated growth. Cases are increasing in number and complexity, and 
courts from all States are struggling to operate in the face of numerous 
impediments and in the absence of clear guidance. Enhanced coop-
eration between the courts of affected States operating within a unified 
but flexible procedural structure would promote the desired goal of 
fair and efficient administration of a transnational debtor's estate. The 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, a succinct piece 
of exemplary legislation drafted by those people most affected by the 
present state of international insolvency chaos, promises to provide the 
foundation for an ordered process. Under the Model Law, (1) credi-
tors, regardless of nationality, will receive non-discriminatory treat-
ment; (2) courts and representatives of insolvency estates will commu-
nicate and cooperate with each other to coordinate the administration 
of such estates and the conduct of concurrent proceedings involving 
the same debtor; and (3) persons authorized to administer reorgani-
zations or liquidations will have expeditious access to foreign courts 
and to the relief they need to protect the assets of the debtor or the 
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interests of the creditors. The Model Law clearly improves on the 
current state of cross-border insolvency despair and should be expedi-
tiously enacted by States interested in maximizing the returns to all 
parties when managing the failure of a transnational commercial en-
terprise. 
Claudia Tobler 
